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FALLING THROUGH THE GAP:  
THE CULPABILITY OF CHILD SOLDIERS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
Ally McQueen* 
INTRODUCTION 
When asked to picture the “poster child” victim of contemporary armed 
conflict, many think of just that: a child.  In the last decade alone, armed conflicts 
have “killed two million children, disabled four to five million children and left 
twelve million children homeless.”
1
  Given those statistics, it is difficult to imagine 
that children could play any role in an armed conflict apart from that of the victim.  
In reality, however, child soldiers
2
 are responsible for some of the most horrific 
atrocities in modern warfare, including grave violations of international criminal 
law. 
“[C]hild soldiering today is a widespread phenomenon, . . . particularly in 
developing countries where political, economic, and social instability are more 
commonplace.”
3
  An estimated 300,000 child soldiers, some as young as seven years 
old, are currently serving both state and nonstate forces in more than thirty 
international and internal conflicts around the world.
4
  Though child soldiers have 
been used in armed conflicts throughout history, current statistics portray a sobering 
 
 * Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2018.  I would like to thank Professor Jimmy 
Gurulé for his helpful guidance and the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review Online for their edits 
and recommendations.  I would also like to give a special thanks to Cassie Redlingshafer—who sat 
next to me on many Swiss train rides spent drafting this Essay—for her friendship and support 
throughout law school.  All errors are my own. 
 1 Amy Beth Abbott, Note, Child Soldiers—The Use of Children as Instruments of War, 23 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 499, 499–500 (2000). 
 2 As it is used throughout this Essay, the term “child soldier” is used to describe children—
male or female—under the age of eighteen who serve an armed organization in any capacity.  This 
broad understanding of child soldiers is consistent with UNICEF’s widely accepted Cape Town 
Principles.  See infra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 3 Susan Tiefenbrun, Child Soldiers, Slavery and the Trafficking of Children, 31 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 415, 421 (2008). 
 4 See Crystal E. Lara, Note, Child Soldier Testimony Used in Prosecuting War Crimes in 
the International Criminal Court: Preventing Further Victimization, 17 SW. J. INT’L L. 309, 313 
(2011); Fact Sheet: Children Associated with Armed Groups and Forces Central Africa, UNICEF, 
https://www.unicef.org/wcaro/FactSheet100601Final_E_100603_.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2018); 
Douglas Farah, Children Forced to Kill, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2000), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/04/08/children-forced-to-kill/f9403901-
0b0f-480f-bad7-16bc78835c81/?utm_term=.00d98dd5fc10. 
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and distinctive trend: a steady increase in the use of individuals under the age of 
eighteen in warfare. 
In response to this disturbing development, the international community has 
explicitly condemned the use and recruitment of child soldiers.  While that much is 
clear, international conventions, U.N. resolutions, and international courts and 
tribunals have failed to explicitly answer two fundamental questions: Should child 
soldiers be prosecuted for their crimes?  If so, at what age should children be held 
legally responsible for their actions, and what legal standard should apply?  This 
Essay will explore this gap in international criminal law and the unique difficulty of 
determining the accountability of children who are both victims and perpetrators. 
This Essay, in Part I, will begin with an overview of the use of child soldiers 
in armed conflicts around the world.  Part II will explore provisions within the 
Geneva Conventions, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Beijing 
Rules that are applicable to child soldiers and can shed some light on their culpability 
after an armed conflict.  In Part III, this Essay will then discuss the varying degrees 
to which international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court have 
addressed the criminal responsibility of children for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.  Finally, Part IV will analyze this fragmented body of international 
criminal law and identify two overarching elements it shares: the best interest of the 
child standard and the emphasis on rehabilitation and reintegration.  This Essay will 
argue that, in light of this consistent message and the realities of child soldiering, 
international criminal law must fix the minimum age of criminal liability at eighteen.  
This Essay will go on to argue that, should a State insist on prosecuting children 
during negotiations with the United Nations to create a hybrid domestic-
international tribunal, a distinct legal standard with explicit protections for young 
perpetrators must be put in place. 
I.     THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS ACROSS THE WORLD 
A.   Who Are Child Soldiers? 
Hundreds of thousands of children under the age of eighteen are currently 
serving in armed forces
5
 in more than thirty countries around the world.
6
  While 
many of these children are engaged directly in warfare, the term “child soldier” 
encompasses far more young people than those who carry weapons, engage in 
combat, or take a direct part in hostilities.  As defined in UNICEF’s widely accepted 
Cape Town Principles, a child soldier is: 
[A]ny person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular 
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, 
porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family 
members.  The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for 
 
 5 Child soldiers are used by a variety of armed groups, “including government-backed 
paramilitary groups, militias and self-defense units, armed groups opposed to central government, 
groups composed of ethnic religious and other minorities, and clan-based or factional groups 
fighting governments.”  Lara, supra note 4, at 313. 
 6 Abbott, supra note 1, at 512. 
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Although the specific number of children who are currently serving in armed 
forces is impossible to verify, most organizations agree that there are approximately 
300,000 child soldiers across the globe.
8
  The most widespread use of child soldiers 
occurs in developing countries, particularly those suffering from continuous political 
and economic instability, and those where a significant portion of the population is 
made up of children.
9
  While the use of child soldiers is most prevalent in Africa, 
where more than 120,000 children are engaged in active combat,
10
 juvenile 
involvement in armed conflict is not limited to that continent.
11
  Beyond African 
countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Somalia, child 




While “[n]o single common social denominator or personal motive links all 
the children who [have been] in combat,”
13
 child soldiers generally come from 
similar backgrounds.
14
  The first children to be recruited into armed groups are 
generally “the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children—those without 
traditional families to protect them, those with little or no education, and those from 
marginalized sectors of society.”
15
  The vast majority of child soldiers come from 
poor, conflict-ridden areas and grow up knowing nothing but war.
16
  Children who 
 
 7 UNICEF, CAPE TOWN PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES 12 (1997), 
https://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf; see also UNICEF, THE PARIS 
PRINCIPLES: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES ON CHILDREN ASSOCIATED WITH ARMED FORCES OR 
ARMED GROUPS 7 (2007), https://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf 
(broadly defining a child soldier as “[a] child associated with an armed force or armed group”). 
 8 Tessa Davis, Note, Lost in Doctrine: Particular Social Group, Child Soldiers, and the 
Failure of U.S. Asylum Law to Protect Exploited Children, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 654 (2011). 
 9 Mary-Hunter Morris, Note, Babies and Bathwater: Seeking an Appropriate Standard of 
Review for the Asylum Applications of Former Child Soldiers, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 281, 283 
(2008). 
 10 Nienke Grossman, Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting Child Soldiers for Human 
Rights Violations, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 323, 326 (2007).  One of the reasons this practice is so 
prominent across Africa is because children make up the majority of the continent’s population.  
DAVID M. ROSEN, ARMIES OF THE YOUNG: CHILD SOLDIERS IN WAR AND TERRORISM 62 (2005).  
Fifty-five percent of the total African population is nineteen years or younger (compared to the 
United States, where this age group only constitutes twenty-eight percent of the population).  Id. 
 11 For a comprehensive list of the countries where children have served as child soldiers, see 
Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 422–32.  For a breakdown of how many children are currently serving 
in various countries, see Farah, supra note 4. 
 12 Jo Becker, A Better US List of Countries Using Child Soldiers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 
29, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/29/better-us-list-countries-using-child-soldiers. 
 13 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 61. 
 14 Child soldiers generally fit this profile regardless of whether they are forcibly recruited or 
they voluntarily join an armed group.  Lara, supra note 4, at 314. 
 15 Stephanie H. Bald, Comment, Searching for a Lost Childhood: Will the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone Find Justice for Its Children?, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 537, 545 (2002). 
 16 Id.; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: 
Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, ¶¶ 37–38, U.N. Doc. A/51/306 (Aug. 26, 1996) [hereinafter 
Machel Report] (explaining that children from poorer sectors are at a particularly high risk for 
2019] F A L L I N G  T H R O U G H  T H E  G A P  103 
have been separated from their families or displaced from their homes are 
particularly vulnerable.
17
  Although “the average age of child soldiers continues to 
decrease, a paradigmatic child soldier is in his or her late preteen to midteenage years 
with the average being between twelve and thirteen years old.”
18
 
B.   Why Are Children Targeted to Fight? 
The decision to target children stems not only from an armed group’s need to 
bolster their forces, but from characteristics inextricably linked to childhood.  
Children are generally more physically and psychologically vulnerable than adults, 
making them easier for armed forces to control, intimidate, and manipulate.
19
  
Children are also less demanding than adults, making them an economically efficient 
source of labor.
20
  Unlike mature soldiers, children are generally willing to serve at 
the “bottom of [the] military hierarchy” and rarely demand pay.
21
 
Groups also target young adolescents and children for their small size and 
sense of fearlessness.  In many cases, a child’s size allows him or her to evade 
capture.
22
  Children’s small size also enables military leaders to use them as “guinea 
pigs” for some of their most dangerous assignments.
23
  Children are often forced “to 
the front lines or [through] minefields ahead of older troops while their commanders 
stay behind.”
24
  While such assignments would sound like a death sentence to older 
soldiers, commanders can easily exploit fearless children who “view themselves as 
invulnerable to harm and injury.”
25
  Finally, many armed groups target children 
because they consider them to be an expendable labor source, particularly as 
compared to trained adults.
26
  In developing countries where children make up as 
much as half of the population, young people are “in such bountiful supply”
27
 that 
“another child will always be available to abduct and exploit.”28 
Though military groups have utilized child soldiers throughout history,
29
 the 
deliberate recruitment of child soldiers has dramatically increased in recent years.  
 
recruitment, while children from wealthier and more educated families are at less risk); Tiefenbrun, 
supra note 3, at 431. 
 17 Davis, supra note 8, at 656. 
 18 Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 19 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 432. 
 20 Davis, supra note 8, at 657. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id.  Not only is it easier for children to hide than adults, but opposing parties generally do 
not suspect children of being soldiers.  Id. 
 23 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 431. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 432–33 (quoting BENJAMIN JAMES SADOCK & VIRGINIA ALCOTT SADOCK, KAPLAN 
& SADOCK’S SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY 38 (9th ed. 2003)). 
 26 Davis, supra note 8, at 657. 
 27 Id. (quoting MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS: FROM VIOLENCE TO PROTECTION 37 
(2006)). 
 28 Id. 
 29 “Children’s participation in armed conflict has occurred for centuries” and they have 
“fought in wars dating back to the Middle Ages.”  Cristina Martinez Squires, Comment, How the 
Law Should View Voluntary Child Soldiers: Does Terrorism Pose a Different Dilemma?, 68 SMU 
L. REV. 567, 567 (2015).  Until the mid-twentieth century, the armies of Western Europe and the 
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Two interrelated factors can explain this rise in the abduction and use of child 
soldiers. 
First, fundamental changes in the nature of armed conflicts have increased the 
use of children as instruments of war.  Unlike past conflicts, which were generally 
“temporary outbreaks of instability” between different states, today’s conflicts are 
characterized by “long, protracted states of mass violence and disorder.”
30
  Since the 
end of the Cold War, the world’s conflicts have also become more internalized, often 
occurring between armed civilians or ethnic factions.
31
  During these internalized 
conflicts, opposing sides generally do not distinguish between children and adults 
and the line between civilian and combatant is often blurred.
32
  In addition, “[w]ars 
are no longer confined to definitive battlefields” and children often find themselves 
in war zones.
33
  With fighting regularly occurring in populated areas, “recruiters can 
easily take children from villages, roadsides, buses, schools, markets, and 
churches.”
34
  Further, modern armed warfare generally lasts much longer than past 
conflicts.
35
  As casualties rise, some armed forces believe that recruiting children is 
an easy and necessary means of filling shortages in manpower.
36
  The length of 
modern wars has also “encouraged military leaders to rationalize the forced 
recruitment and use of children as a low cost military measure.”
37
 
Second, many argue that technological developments and the emergence of the 
small-arms trade have transformed the roles children are capable of playing in war.  
With the emergence of lightweight, easy-to-carry weapons, children are no longer 
limited to serving in indirect support roles such as lookouts, spies, or messengers.
38
  
Modern-day weapons such as assault rifles, machine guns, hand grenades, and 
pistols are easy to operate and can be used as effectively by children as adults.
39
  
These technological advances have made it much easier for young people to become 
 
United States were filled with “boy soldiers.”  See generally ROSEN, supra note 10, at 4–8 
(describing the prominence of American and British soldiers under the age of eighteen in the 
Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and World War I).  See also id. at 19–56 (detailing the use of 
Jewish child soldiers during World War II). 
 30 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 430.  In her famous U.N. Report The Impact of War on 
Children, Graça Machel attributed the “callousness of modern warfare” to the breakdown of 
traditional societies brought about by globalization and social revolution.  Machel Report, supra 
note 16, ¶ 4; see also id. ¶¶ 4, 24 (distinguishing traditional, rule-bound warfare from conflicts in 
postcolonial states where “all standards [are] abandoned” and a special “sense of dislocation and 
chaos” reigns). 
 31 Bald, supra note 15, at 544. 
 32 Lara, supra note 4, at 313–14. 
 33 Bald, supra note 15, at 542. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 428. 
 36 Id. at 430. 
 37 Id. at 428.  In Angola, for instance, the civil war spanned over thirty years, making 
volunteers difficult to find.  “To alleviate the manpower shortage, [Angola’s] rebel and government 
forces look[ed] to the nation’s youth to fill their army’s ranks.”  Abbott, supra note 1, at 511. 
 38 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 14. 
 39 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 431.  But see ROSEN, supra note 10, at 14. 
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direct combatants in an armed conflict.  As a result of the international arms trade, 
most of these weapons are relatively affordable and easy to obtain.
40
 
C.   How Are Child Soldiers Recruited? 
Children’s recruitment in armed conflict is either by force or voluntary.  A 
significant portion of the children who participate in armed conflicts are abducted or 
forcibly recruited after receiving threats.
41
  Countless children have been taken from 
their own homes,
42
 while others have been arbitrarily removed from public spaces 
such as buses, marketplaces, churches, and refugee camps.
43
  Children who 
volunteer for service in armed groups may be driven to do so by a range of “cultural, 
social, economic or political pressures.”
44
  Most children who volunteer for 
participation in conflicts do so in order to fulfill their basic needs.
45
  In war-torn and 
impoverished areas, children may think that alternative means of securing consistent 
food and shelter are simply unavailable.
46
  For others, service with an armed group 
is seen as a means of ensuring their own safety.
47
  Many children join “merely in an 
attempt to survive,” understandably feeling safer as armed soldiers than as 
defenseless civilians.
48
  Those who have grown up in a war-torn environment may 
feel obligated to join the military regime out of a sense of loyalty or in order to 
avenge the death or deaths of close family members and friends.
49
  For some 
children, the decision stems from a desire to be part of a cohesive group.
50
  
“[Children] want to belong to something, especially if they live in a society that has 
collapsed completely,” and armed groups can provide them with the structured 
community they seek.
51
  Others are simply bored, attracted to the culture of violence 
they have been raised in, and lacking the education necessary to understand what 




 40 Monique Ramgoolie, Prosecution of Sierra Leone’s Child Soldiers: What Message Is the 
UN Trying to Send?, 12 J. PUB. & INT’L AFF. 145, 148 (2001).  In some parts of Africa, AK-47s 
are available for less than six dollars.  Id. 
 41 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 423. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Abbott, supra note 1, at 514. 
 44 Machel Report, supra note 16, ¶ 38. 
 45 Abbott, supra note 1, at 516. 
 46 Many poor and hungry families are coerced to sell their children to armed forces in order 
to secure food or money.  Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 432.  “Many of these parents do not 
understand the danger they are subjecting their child[ren] to by making them join the army.”  Id.; 
see also Machel Report, supra note 16, ¶ 39. 
 47 Machel Report, supra note 16, ¶ 41 (“Faced with violence and chaos all around, they 
decide they are safer with guns in their hands.”). 
 48 Abbott, supra note 1, at 516. 
 49 Id.; see also Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 431–32. 
 50 Errol Barnett, Ex-Child-Soldier: “Shooting Became Just Like Drinking a Glass of Water,” 
CNN (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/08/world/africa/ishmael-beah-child-
soldier/index.html. 
 51 Id. 
 52 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 61; Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 427.  
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D.   What Roles Do Child Soldiers Play in Armed Conflict? 
After child soldiers are conscripted, they “enter a new world”
53
 filled with 
violence and “the worst forms of child abuse.”
54
  From the beginning of their 
association with the armed group, young people are deliberately exposed to horrific 
scenes and “forced to participate in acts of extreme violence and barbarity including 
beheadings, amputations, rape, and the burning of people alive.”
55
  Desensitizing 
children to the sight and commission of atrocities “brainwashe[s them] . . . until their 
ethics and moral values become so distorted” that they robotically obey orders.
56
 
For many child soldiers, participation in armed conflict begins with brutal 
hazing practices aimed at desensitizing them to violence and turning them into 
hardened, dangerous killing machines.  These indoctrination procedures can 
“include everything from torture and beatings inflicted upon the new recruit to 
forcing him or her to commit these atrocities on others.”
57
  In order to keep the child 
firmly within the army’s control, many are forced to commit acts of violence against 
their families, friends, or members of their communities as part of their 
indoctrination.
58
  Forcing children to kill or disfigure someone they know effectively 
dissolves their ties with the world outside of the armed group and ensures that they 
will be permanently alienated from their family and community.
59
  Over the course 
of their association with the armed group, “[c]hildren endure torture, physical abuse, 
and threats of death” to maintain their obedience.
60
  Military officials do not hesitate 
to execute attempted escapees,
61
 and children are threatened with death or 
dismemberment if they refuse to fight.
62
 
Fighting groups generally do not afford child soldiers any special treatment 
because of their young age.
63
  To the contrary, child soldiers generally “suffer[] 
additional exploitive abuse because of their age.”
64
  Because they are viewed as 
expendable, children are often given the most dangerous tasks and pushed to the 
front lines.  Armed groups often capitalize on a child’s size and inexperience by 
using them to clear unexplored areas or sending them “to serve as advance forces in 
ambush attacks and in suicide bombings.”
65
  Since “[t]he youngest children rarely 
appreciate the perils they face,” many armed groups use hallucinatory drugs or 
alcohol to further manipulate their child soldiers and capitalize on their 
 
 53 Davis, supra note 8, at 658. 
 54 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 16. 
 55 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 425. 
 56 Id. at 423. 
 57 Grossman, supra note 10, at 328. 
 58 Id. 
 59 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 16. 
 60 Davis, supra note 8, at 658. 
 61 Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 423.  Children are often “required to kill friends who don’t 
obey the commanders, and made to watch the punishment of other child soldiers who attempt in 
vain to escape.”  Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See Bald, supra note 15, at 552. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Abbott, supra note 1, at 507–08. 
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fearlessness.
66
  Those who are not engaged directly in combat serve in “support 
functions which entail great risk and hardship.”
67
 
Although the majority of child soldiers are boys, armed groups also recruit 
girls, many of whom perform combat functions.
68
  In addition to the roles they share 
with their male counterparts, female child soldiers also face gender-specific abuses.  
Many are “given to military commanders as ‘wives,’ and victimized by sexual 
violence on a daily basis.”
69
 
II.     INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW’S GUIDANCE ON THE CULPABILITY OF 
CHILDREN INVOLVED IN ARMED CONFLICT 
While there is not one particular instrument that clearly lays out whether 
children involved in armed conflicts should be held accountable for their crimes, 
various binding and nonbinding sources of international law can shed some light on 
this question.  This Part will explore three sources of international law that are 
particularly relevant to the culpability of child soldiers: the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and its Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, 
and the Beijing Rules.
70
  While these treaty-based laws seems to permit the arrest, 
trial, and imprisonment of child soldiers, none of these instruments establish a 
minimum age of criminal liability. 
A.   The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are at the core of international 
humanitarian law.  Each of the Conventions seeks to protect people who are not 
taking part in international hostilities, and the fourth Convention provides specific 
standards for the treatment of civilians, including children, in times of war.
71
  
Though the Conventions contemplate the possibility that minors can commit war 
crimes and can lawfully be prosecuted for their acts, they fail to set a minimum age 
 
 66 Machel Report, supra note 16, ¶ 47. 
 67 Id. ¶ 44 (listing child solders’ various support functions, including serving as porters and 
performing household duties). 
 68 Jan Goodwin, Sierra Leone Is No Place to Be Young, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 1999), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/14/magazine/sierra-leone-is-no-place-to-be-young.html.  
Young girls “make up forty percent of the ranks of armed groups in some countries.”  Tiefenbrun, 
supra note 3, at 424. 
 69 Id. at 424; see also, e.g., Machel Report, supra note 16, ¶ 45 (describing the practice of 
marrying off girls abducted by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda to rebel leaders); Goodwin, 
supra note 68 (recounting the experience of “I,” a young Sierra Leonean girl who was abducted 
from her village and forced to become a sex slave for rebel forces). 
 70 Other nonbinding sources of international law that are relevant to the culpability of child 
soldiers but are beyond the scope of this Essay include the Cape Town Principles and Best 
Practices, the Paris Principles, and the Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful 
Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups. 
 71 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 
50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] 
(concerning the care and education of children during times of war). 
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of criminal responsibility.  Apart from excluding children from capital punishment,
72
 
no distinction is made in the Geneva Conventions between prosecuting adults and 
juveniles. 
Additional Protocols I and II of 1977 add much-needed clarity to the standards 
of treatment of children during an armed conflict, but still leave many questions 
regarding their culpability open to debate.  Additional Protocol I, which focuses on 
the protection of civilians in international armed conflicts, emphasizes that 
“[c]hildren shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected against any 
form of indecent assault.”
73
  The Protocol added a provision obligating States to 
prevent children under the age of fifteen from taking part in international armed 
conflict
74
 and reiterated Convention IV’s prohibition on the death penalty for 
youthful offenders.
75
  Though Brazil’s representative suggested during the drafting 
period that Additional Protocol I should include a minimum age of criminal 




Additional Protocol II, which focuses on the protection of civilians in internal 
armed conflicts, echoes many of these provisions.  Article 4 provides that “[c]hildren 
who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the armed 
forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities,”
77
 and Article 6 “applies to 
the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences related to the armed conflict.”
78
  
Again, no explicit guidance is given in Additional Protocol II as to whether child 
soldiers can or should be prosecuted for their crimes.  Article 6 limits itself to 
banning the death penalty for crimes committed by children,
79
 enumerating a series 
of due process rights to which offenders are entitled,
80
 and broadly stating that “[a]t 
 
 72 See id. art. 68 (“In any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected 
person who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offence.”). 
 73 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims in International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 77, ¶ 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
 74 Id. art. 77, ¶ 2 (“The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that 
children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, in 
particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed forces.  In recruiting among 
those . . . who have not attained the age of eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict shall endeavour 
to give priority to those who are oldest.”). 
 75 Id. art. 77, ¶ 5 (“The death penalty for an offence related to the armed conflict shall not be 
executed on persons who had not attained the age of eighteen years at the time the offence was 
committed.”). 
 76 During the negotiations of Additional Protocol I, the representative of Brazil proposed that 
Article 77 include a prohibition on the prosecution of children under the age of sixteen.  See 
Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers: Victims or Perpetrators?, 29 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 56, 74 
(2008). 
 77 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4, ¶ 3(c), June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. 
 78 Id. art. 6, ¶ 1. 
 79 Id. art. 6, ¶ 4. 
 80 Id. art. 6, ¶¶ 2, 3. 
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the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest 
possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict.”
81
 
B.   The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) is the most 
widely ratified human rights instrument in history.
82
  It was the first U.N. convention 
devoted solely to children’s rights, and it remains the most comprehensive treaty 
concerned with issues related to children’s well-being today.
83
  Despite its wide-
ranging protections for children,
84
 the CRC dances around the accountability of 
children who commit crimes.  The CRC’s sometimes-contradictory provisions seem 
to allow for the criminal prosecution and imprisonment of juvenile offenders, but 
the Convention fails to set a minimum age of criminal responsibility.  Though the 
Convention clearly defines a child as “every human being below the age of eighteen 
years,”
85
 it opts to allow its State Parties to determine whether children should be 
prosecuted for crimes committed during armed conflicts.
86
 
The overriding substantive mandate of the CRC can be found in Article 3, 
which requires that “[i]n all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by 
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities 
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration.”
87
  Under this “umbrella provision,” “when two or more rights are in 
apparent conflict, the best interests of the child is the guiding consideration.”
88
 
Articles 37 and 40 provide extensive due process rights for children and give 
some important insights into whether they should be prosecuted for crimes 
committed as minors.  First and foremost, the CRC states that children cannot be 
“deprived of [their] liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily” and, should “arrest, detention 
or imprisonment” be considered appropriate in a particular case, it “shall be used 
only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”
89
  
Like the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, the CRC bans capital 
 
 81 Id. art. 6, ¶ 5. 
 82 The CRC has been ratified by every country in the world except the United States and 
Somalia.  Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 439. 
 83 Abbott, supra note 1, at 502–03. 
 84 The CRC broadly covers “three baskets” of rights to which all children are entitled.  Linda 
A. Malone, Maturing Justice: Integrating the Convention on the Rights of the Child into the 
Judgments and Processes of the International Criminal Court, 43 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 599, 
602 (2015).  “First, they have to be provided with adequate nutrients, shelter, family environment, 
education, healthcare and recreation.  Second, they should be protected from abuse and 
exploitation.  Third, they should participate in decision making for themselves and in social, 
economic, religious, and political life.”  Id. 
 85 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448 [hereinafter 
Convention on the Rights of the Child]. 
 86 See infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 87 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 3, ¶ 1. 
 88 Malone, supra note 84, at 617. 
 89 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 37(b). 
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punishment.
90
  Article 37(a) adds that children also should not be sentenced to “life 
imprisonment without possibility of release . . . for offences committed [when they 
were] below eighteen years of age.”
91
  Article 40 goes on to say that, when dealing 
with children who have “infringed the penal law,” “States Parties . . . [shall] take[] 
into account the child’s age and the desirability of promoting the child’s 
reintegration and the child’s assuming a constructive role in society.”
92
  Though 
Article 40 lays out a list of due process guarantees “[e]very child alleged as or 
accused of having infringed the penal law” is entitled to,
93
 the CRC leaves it to State 
Parties to set a baseline age of criminal responsibility.
94
  As a result of this provision, 
the minimum age of criminal responsibility is left up to national legislatures and 
varies widely from country to country.
95
  Article 40 also leaves it to State Parties to 
determine when it is “appropriate and desirable” to institute “measures for dealing 
with such children without resorting to judicial proceedings.”
96
 
The CRC provision most directly related to the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers is Article 38.  Article 38 prohibits State Parties from recruiting anyone under 
the age of fifteen into their armed forces and requires them to “take all feasible 
measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not 
take a direct part in hostilities.”
97
  This provision falls short in a number of respects.  
In addition to ignoring the use of child soldiers by nonstate actors, Article 38 does 
not protect children from serving in roles indirectly related to combat.  It also does 
not protect children who “volunteer” for service in armed conflicts.  Recognizing 
these deficiencies and the modern rise in the use of child soldiers around the world, 
the CRC was amended in 2000 to include the Optional Protocol on the Involvement 
of Children in Armed Conflict.
98
  The Optional Protocol is now the international 
 
 90 Id. art. 37(a). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. art. 40, ¶ 1. 
 93 See id. art. 40, ¶ 2(b)(i)–(vii). 
 94 Id. art. 40, ¶ 3(a).  This wide grant of power to the CRC’s State Parties is not without limit.  
General Comment 10 to the CRC adds that the age of twelve should be the absolute minimum age 
of criminal responsibility.  Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 10: Children’s 
Rights in Juvenile Justice, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10 (Apr. 25, 2007). 
 95  
A sampling of baseline ages of criminal responsibility over the past decade include: 
seven (Switzerland, Nigeria, South Africa); ten (Australia, New Zealand); twelve 
(Canada, Netherlands, Uganda); thirteen (France, Afghanistan); fourteen (Japan, 
Germany, Austria, Italy, Russian Federation, Sierra Leone); fifteen (Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark); sixteen (Spain, Portugal); and eighteen (Belgium, Brazil, Peru). 
MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 104 
(2012). 
 96 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 40(3)(b).  This provision 
suggests a variety of alternatives to judicial proceedings and institutional care, including “care, 
guidance and supervision orders; counselling; probation; foster care; [and] education and 
vocational training programmes.”  Id. art. 40(4).  
 97 Id. art. 38, ¶¶ 2–3. 
 98 See Malone, supra note 84, at 601; Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 442–45. 
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community’s main legal instrument addressing the use of children as soldiers, and it 
has been ratified nearly as widely as the CRC.
99
 
Recognizing that the CRC’s standard for recruitment had not adequately 
protected children, the Optional Protocol greatly strengthened the Convention by 
amending the minimum age for compulsory recruitment.  Under Articles 2 and 4 of 
the Optional Protocol, both state and nonstate forces cannot forcibly recruit children 
under the age of eighteen.
100
  While nonstate forces are also prohibited from 
accepting voluntary recruits under the age of eighteen,
101
 that rule does not 
necessarily extend to State Parties.  A loophole can be found in Article 3, which 
requires States to “raise the minimum age for . . . voluntary recruitment” above 
fifteen but sets no hard and fast line requiring the minimum age to exceed eighteen 
years of age.
102
  Hypothetically, national armed forces could accept voluntary 
recruits who are fifteen years and one day old so long as some of the “safeguards” 
set out in Article 3 of the Optional Protocol are in place.
103
 
Despite the confusing provisions regarding compulsory and voluntary 
recruitment of children in these instruments, both Article 38 and the Optional 
Protocol clearly emphasize the importance of rehabilitating child soldiers and 
reintegrating them into their communities.  Reiterating the Convention’s focus on 
the best interests of the child, Article 39 of the CRC provides that “States Parties 
shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery 
and social reintegration of a child victim of . . . armed conflicts.”
104
  The Optional 
Protocol builds on this provision, adding that “States Parties shall take all feasible 
measures to ensure that persons within their jurisdiction recruited or used in 
hostilities . . . are demobilized” and given “all appropriate assistance for their 
physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.”
105
 
C.   The Beijing Rules 
The U.N. Nations Standard Minimum Rules on the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice, more commonly known as “the Beijing Rules,” is a set of guidelines for the 
minimum treatment of children in the juvenile justice system.
106
  While the Rules 
 
 99 One hundred and sixty-seven states are currently parties to the Optional Protocol; another 
twelve have signed it but have not ratified it.  Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict, Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflict, UNITED NATIONS, https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/tools-for-action/opac/ 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2018). 
 100 Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict and on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, 
arts. 2, 4, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 (Mar. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Optional Protocol to the CRC]. 
 101 Id. art 4, ¶ 1. 
 102 Id. art 3, ¶ 1. 
 103 See id. art. 3, ¶¶ 2–3. 
 104 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 39. 
 105 Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 100, art. 6, ¶ 3; see also id. art. 7, ¶ 1 (requiring 
State Parties to “cooperate in the implementation of the present Protocol, including in . . . the 
rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons who are victims of acts contrary to this Protocol”). 
 106 Noëlle Quénivet, Does and Should International Law Prohibit the Prosecution of Children 
for War Crimes?, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 433, 439 (2017).  These guidelines were the product of a 
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are not binding, they are meant to serve as a model to U.N. Member States.  Several 
of the basic principles set out in the Beijing Rules are relevant to the treatment of 
child soldiers. 
Like the Geneva Conventions and the CRC, the Beijing Rules fail to set a clear 
minimum age of liability.  Instead, the Rules broadly allow “those legal systems 
recognizing the concept of the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles” to fix 
liability at an age of their choice so long as it is not “too low.”
107
 
Though the Beijing Rules do not negate the capacity of young offenders to 
commit offenses or remove a State’s ability to prosecute them, they repeatedly stress 
that “[t]he juvenile justice system shall emphasize the well-being of the juvenile.”
108
  
The Beijing Rules clearly favor diversion to community services over 
institutionalization, which they describe as “a disposition of last resort and for the 
minimum necessary period.”
109
  The Rules provide an extensive list of alternatives 
to institutionalization that “shall be made available to the competent authority,” 
including probation, community service, intermediate treatment, and group 
counseling.
110
  Like Additional Protocol II and the CRC, the Beijing Rules also 
enumerate a series of due process protections for children in the juvenile justice 
system
111
 and expressly prohibit capital and corporal punishment.
112
 
III.     CHILD SOLDIERS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
Much like the United Nation’s conventions and policy guidelines, the United 
Nation’s international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court have 
largely sidestepped the question of children’s culpability.  This Part will discuss the 
 
meeting of the United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
in 1980.  See Barry Goldson & John Muncie, Rethinking Youth Justice: Comparative Analysis, 
International Human Rights and Research Evidence, 6 YOUTH JUST. 91, 96 (2006). 
 107 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The 
Beijing Rules), ¶ 4.1, U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/33 (Nov. 29, 1985) [hereinafter Beijing Rules].  In 
setting the minimum age of criminal responsibility, the Beijing Rules require States to “bear[] in 
mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.”  Id.  Commentary to the Rule 
explains that disparities in national ages of criminal responsibility are inevitable given cultural and 
historical differences between States and will range “from 7 years to 18 years or above.”  See id. 
¶ 2, cmt. 2.2. 
 108 Id. ¶ 5.1; see also id. ¶ 17.1(d) (“The well-being of the juvenile shall be the guiding factor 
in the consideration of her or his case.”).  Unlike other instruments of international law, the Beijing 
Rules also instruct juvenile justice systems to take considerations of a child’s individual 
circumstances and the circumstances of the offense into account.  See, e.g., id. ¶ 5.1 (“[A]ny 
reaction to juvenile offenders shall always be in proportion to the circumstances of both the 
offenders and the offence.”). 
 109 Id. ¶ 19.1; see also id. ¶ 18.1 (stating that institutionalization should be avoided “to the 
greatest extent possible”). 
 110 Id. ¶ 18.1(a)–(h). 
 111 Id. ¶ 7.1 (providing that “at all stages of proceedings” a series of “[b]asic procedural 
safeguards such as the presumption of innocence, the right to be notified of the charges, the right 
to remain silent, the right to counsel, the right to the presence of a parent or guardian, the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses and the right to appeal” must be available to the juvenile). 
 112 Id. ¶¶ 17.2, 17.3. 
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Nuremberg Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
and the International Criminal Court and the varying degrees to which they have 
addressed the criminal responsibility of children. 
A.   Early International Criminal Tribunals 
Despite the fact that thousands of child soldiers participated in armed conflicts 
throughout the twentieth century, the earliest international criminal tribunals 
completely failed to address children’s culpability.  Soldiers below the age of 
eighteen fought for both sides in World War II, but no mention was made of the age 
at which criminal responsibility began in the Nuremberg Charter.
113
  The Nuremberg 
Military Tribunal, the international community’s first ad hoc court, did not charge 
anyone under the age of eighteen for crimes committed during the war.
114
 
For several decades after World War II, “international criminal law largely 
remained silent on the question of the penal responsibility of minors for 
extraordinary international crimes.”
115
  When the U.N. Security Council established 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the first 
court of its kind in half a century, it again failed to address the culpability of child 
soldiers in its charter.
116
  The two youngest people prosecuted by the ICTY, Anto 
Furundžija and Dražen Erdemović, were both twenty-three years old at the time of 
the commission of their crimes.
117
  When the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) was established the following year, the Security Council again 
offered no guidance regarding the age of criminal responsibility.
118
  Though children 
as young as five were accused of participating in the genocide, the tribunal left it to 
Rwanda’s national courts to decide whether young people should be prosecuted for 
their offenses.
119
  Like the ICTY, the ICTR did not prosecute anyone who was under 
 
 113 Malone, supra note 84, at 605.  See generally Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 284 (limiting the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to 
“major war criminals” but failing to impose a minimum age of liability).  There was also no mention 
of the age at which criminal responsibility began in Control Council Law No. 10 or Control Council 
Ordinance No. 7.  DRUMBL, supra note 95, at 117. 
 114 DRUMBL, supra note 95, at 117.  The closest the Nuremberg Tribunal came to the issue of 
children’s culpability was during its prosecution of Baldur von Schirach, a Nazi German politician 
who was the head of the Hitler Youth from 1931 to 1940.  Id.  “Although the [International Military 
Tribunal] prosecuted Baldur von Schirach for inter alia his use of the Hitler Youth, it did not 
address crimes committed by the youth themselves.”  Id.  Relatedly, the Tokyo Tribunal only 
conducted trials of the Japanese leadership and did not prosecute any minors.  Id. 
 115 Id. at 118. 
 116 See generally Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 117 Quénivet, supra note 106, at 446. 
 118 See generally Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
 119 National institutions in Rwanda have tried multiple people who were under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the genocide for their involvement therein.  See infra notes 190–1 and 
accompanying text. 
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the age of eighteen at the time they committed their offense.
120
  In the absence of 
language to the contrary, both the ICTY and the ICTR’s statutes could be interpreted 
to permit the prosecution of child soldiers for their crimes.
121
 
B.   The Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone’s civil war was “one of the most brutal in Africa.”
122
  Over the 
course of the eleven-year conflict, half of Sierra Leone’s population was displaced, 
thousands of children were separated from their families, over fifty thousand people 
were killed, and thousands of people were mutilated.
123
  While these statistics are 
jarring, what truly set this conflict apart from others was the unprecedented use of 
child soldiers.
124
  Throughout the conflict, both the national government’s army and 
the infamous Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF) rebel forces
125
 placed children as 
young as seven on the front lines.  At any one time, an estimated five thousand 
children were serving as soldiers, fighting on both sides of the war.
126
  Children 
“spread unspeakable fear throughout” the country and “were responsible for 
thousands of murders, mutilations, and rapes, and for torture, forced labor, and 
sexual slavery.”
127
  Under the influence of narcotics and alcohol, children were 
 
 120 UNICEF, CHILDREN AND TRUTH COMMISSIONS 17 (2010).  Given the uncertainty in the 
statute, the ICTR’s lead prosecutor “decided that children aged 14 to 18 would not be tried by the 
ICTR or called as witnesses to testify.”  Id. 
 121 While some argue that these omissions from the ICTY and the ICTR’s jurisdiction were 
intentional and suggest that the courts would be entitled to prosecute a minor, “others have argued 
that such a deliberate omission ‘seems to have been premised on a belief that such a provision was 
unnecessary as no such prosecutions would take place.’”  Alice S. Debarre, Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration of Juvenile War Criminals: A De Facto Ban on Their Criminal Prosecution?, 44 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 6 (2015) (quoting Happold, supra note 76, at 84–85). 
 122 Ismene Zarifis, Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability of Child Soldiers, 9 
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 18, 18 (2002), 
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&
httpsredir=1&article=1459&context=hrbrief.  For a brief overview of the origins of the conflict and 
its ultimate conclusion in 2001, see The Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 
11, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/11/armed-conflict-sierra-leone. 
 123 Ramgoolie, supra note 40, at 147. 
 124 Id. at 146; see also ROSEN, supra note 10, at 2 (“Sierra Leone is the poster-child case of 
the modern child-soldier crisis.”); Ramgoolie, supra note 40, at 147 (“Child combatants played an 
unprecedented, large, and violent role in the Sierra Leone civil war . . . .”).  For the story of one 
child soldier’s abduction, service in the RUF, and eventual rehabilitation, see ISHMAEL BEAH, A 
LONG WAY GONE: MEMOIRS OF A BOY SOLDIER (2007). 
 125 The RUF committed countless gross human rights violations over the course of Sierra 
Leone’s civil war and “evolved into one of the worst agents of terror in contemporary Africa.”  
ROSEN, supra note 10, at 60.  “Widespread and indiscriminate murder, rape, and amputation of 
limbs were signature crimes of the RUF.”  Zarifis, supra note 122, at 19. 
 126 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 61.  By some estimates, half of all RUF combatants were between 
the ages of eight and fourteen.  Id. at 62; see also Goodwin, supra note 68 (estimating that children 
made up between forty and fifty percent of the RUF’s total force of around 15,000).  On the 
Government side, officials have admitted that children composed a fifth of their forces.  Id. 
 127 ROSEN, supra note 10, at 58. 
2019] F A L L I N G  T H R O U G H  T H E  G A P  115 
easily manipulated into committing many of the most atrocious murders, 
amputations, and mutilations during the civil war.
128
 
After observing the seriousness of the situation in Sierra Leone, the U.N. 
Security Council took its first major step toward the creation of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone (SCSL) when it unanimously passed Security Council Resolution 
1315 (“Resolution 1315”) in 2000.
129
  Resolution 1315 proposed a novel structure 
for the SCSL.  Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which were established pursuant to 
Security Council resolutions and granted Chapter VII powers, the Security Council 
proposed a domestic-international hybrid tribunal that would be created pursuant to 
a treaty-based agreement.
130
  The proposed court would incorporate aspects of both 
international and domestic law and would be jointly administered by the Sierra 
Leonean government and the United Nations.
131
 
Resolution 1315 authorized the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to negotiate an 
agreement with Sierra Leone’s government to create this independent special 
court.
132
  Given the pervasive use of child soldiers throughout the conflict and the 
scale of the atrocities they committed, the criminal culpability of young people was 
one of the most contentious issues during those negotiations.
133
  Sierra Leone’s 
government and numerous Sierra Leoneans who had suffered at the hands of child 
soldiers felt that justice could not be served unless some children were put on trial 
for their crimes.
134
  Many international humanitarian groups and U.N. 
representatives, on the other hand, lobbied against prosecuting anyone who was 
below the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes.
135
 
In the report he prepared for the Security Council, Kofi Annan prefaced his 
discussion of this contentious issue by stating that “most if not all of these children 
have been subjected to a process of psychological and physical abuse and duress 
which has transformed them from victims into perpetrators.”
136
  He went on to 
clarify that “although the children of Sierra Leone may be among those who have 
committed the worst crimes, they are to be regarded first and foremost as victims.”
137
  
Nonetheless, Secretary-General Annan ultimately recommended that “in view of the 
most horrific aspects of the child combatancy in Sierra Leone,” the court “would not 




 128 See Mark Iacono, Note, The Child Soldiers of Sierra Leone: Are They Accountable for 
Their Actions in War?, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 445, 449 (2003); see also DRUMBL, 
supra note 95, at 80 (“In Sierra Leone, . . . commonly used drugs included cannabis, cocaine, 
amphetamines, and barbiturates.  At times, powdered cocaine or heroin was mixed with gunpowder, 
resulting in a concoction known as brown-brown.”). 
 129 See generally S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). 
 130 See generally id. 
 131 Id. ¶ 2. 
 132 Id. ¶ 1. 
 133 See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, ¶¶ 32–38, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000). 
 134 See id. ¶ 35. 
 135 See id. 
 136 Id. ¶ 32. 
 137 Id. ¶ 7. 
 138 Id. ¶ 36. 
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After extensive negotiations, Sierra Leone and the United Nations agreed upon 
the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone in January 2002 (“the Statute”).
139
  
The court was given “the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra 
Leonean law.”
140
  Adopting the Secretary-General’s recommendation, the court’s 
jurisdiction was extended to persons who were between the ages of fifteen and 
eighteen at the time of the commission of their crimes.
141
  It was the first time in 
history that an international tribunal was legally empowered to prosecute individuals 
who were under the age of eighteen.  The Statute added additional safeguards for 
juvenile offenders, requiring that: 
Should any person who was at the time of the alleged commission of the crime 
between 15 and 18 years of age come before the Court, he or she shall be treated 
with dignity and a sense of worth, taking into account his or her young age and 
the desirability of promoting his or her rehabilitation, reintegration into and 
assumption of a constructive role in society, and in accordance with international 
human rights standards, in particular the rights of the child.
142
 
Though juvenile offenders could be subjected to a full trial under this 
provision, the Statute granted them the presumption of rehabilitation and 




Although the Statute left the door open for children to be tried for their crimes, 
the Prosecutor for the Court, David Crane, quickly made it very clear that he would 
never prosecute anyone under the age of eighteen.
144
  In a 2002 press release, Crane 
said, “[t]he children of Sierra Leone have suffered enough both as victims and 
perpetrators.  I am not interested in prosecuting children.  I want to prosecute the 
people who forced thousands of children to commit unspeakable crimes.”
145
  
Consistent with his word, the SCSL became the first tribunal to convict individuals 
 
 139 Bald, supra note 15, at 560. 
 140 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1, ¶ 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145 
[hereinafter SCSL Statute]. 
 141 Id. art. 7, ¶ 1.  It was never made explicitly clear why the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility was fixed at fifteen, but:  
[I]t seems that the intention was to mirror the provisions on the recruitment and use 
of child soldiers in the two [Additional Protocols] and the CRC, on the ground that 
if children under fifteen are too young to be recruited, they must be too young to 
be held criminally accountable for their actions. 
Happold, supra note 76, at 80. 
 142 SCSL Statute, supra note 140, art. 7, ¶ 1. 
 143 See id. art. 7, ¶ 2.  The Court was limited to providing rehabilitative sentences, including 
“care guidance and supervision orders, community service orders, counselling, foster care, 
correctional, educational and vocational training programmes, approved schools and, as 
appropriate, any programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or programmes of 
child protection agencies.”  Id. 
 144 See DRUMBL, supra note 95, at 123. 
 145 Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Public Affairs Office, Special Court 
Prosecutor Says He Will Not Prosecute Children (Nov. 2, 2002), 
http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/OTP/prosecutor-110202.pdf (statement of David Crane, 
Prosecutor for the Special Court for Sierra Leone). 
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for the recruitment and use of child soldiers.
146
  No one who was below the age of 
eighteen at the time of their crimes was prosecuted.
147
 
C.   The International Criminal Court 
The International Criminal Court (ICC), a permanent international tribunal 
with jurisdiction over “[t]he crime of genocide; [c]rimes against humanity; [w]ar 
crimes; [and t]he crime of aggression,” was officially established pursuant to the 
Rome Statute in 2002.
148
  In striking contrast to the Nuremberg Charter and the 
statutes creating the ICTY and the ICTR, the Rome Statute contains numerous 
references to children.
149
  Child-specific provisions occur throughout the Rome 
Statute’s list of substantive offenses in Articles 6, 7, and 8.
150
  Building off of the 
innovative provisions developed for the SCSL, Article 8 classifies the act of 
“[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces 
or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities” as a war crime.
151
 
Since the Rome Statute came into force in 2002, “crimes committed against 
children during armed conflict have figured prominently in indictments issued by 
the ICC.”
152
  In the first case before the ICC, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a former 
warlord from the Democratic Republic of Congo, was found guilty on charges of 
conscripting, enlisting, and using child soldiers under the age of fifteen to actively 
participate in the rebel forces under his command.
153
  Building on this precedent, the 
 
 146 See ROSEN, supra note 10, at 146.  For a list of the individuals who were charged with 
unlawfully recruiting children under the age of fifteen, see id. at 147; see also Steven Freeland, 
Mere Children or Weapons of War—Child Soldiers and International Law, 29 U. LA VERNE L. 
REV. 19, 20–21 (2008) (describing the SCSL’s prosecution and sentencing of RUF leaders, the 
former President of Liberia, and others on charges of conscripting or enlisting children into armed 
forces and using them to participate actively in hostilities). 
 147 See DRUMBL, supra note 95, at 123. 
 148 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 149 See, e.g., id. pmbl. (“[D]uring this century millions of children . . . have been victims of 
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”). 
 150 Note that, despite its groundbreaking inclusion of children in many of its substantive and 
procedural provisions, the Rome Statute does not contain a definition of a “child.” 
 151 Rome Statute, supra note 148, art. 8, ¶ 2(e)(vii).  The Rome Statute classifies the act of 
conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen as a war crime in both international armed 
conflicts and in “armed conflict not of an international character.”  Id. art. 8, ¶ 2(c); see also id. art. 
8, ¶ 2(b)(xxvi).  Recognizing the additional atrocities that young girls conscripted into armed 
groups face, the Rome Statute also makes “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, [and] forced 
pregnancy” a war crime.  Id. art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(xxii). 
 152 Office of the Special Representative of the Sec’y-Gen. for Children & Armed Conflict, 
Role of the International Criminal Court, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/role-of-the-icc/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2018) 
[hereinafter Role of the ICC]. 
 153 See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Summary of the Judgment 
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 14, 2012).  In this groundbreaking decision, the ICC also 
acknowledged “that the distinction between voluntary and forced recruitment is artificial and 
recognized the broader interpretation of the definition of child soldiers to include girls and boys 
who serve in support roles.”  Role of the ICC, supra note 152. 
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ICC has prosecuted other individuals for the exploitation of child soldiers in the 




 and the Central African Republic.
156
 
In addition to creating a forum for prosecuting those responsible for 
conscripting children, the Rome Statute clearly excludes young people from the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.  Article 26 provides that “[t]he Court shall have no 
jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged 
commission of a crime.”
157
  Article 26 “elicited only brief discussion at the Rome 
Conference, where delegates were reluctant to engage with the conundrum of 
children as atrocity perpetrators.”
158
  Given the wide-ranging ages of criminal 
responsibility among nations, the drafters decided that it was best to leave the 
decision to prosecute children for crimes proscribed by the Rome Statute to state 
discretion.
159
  Other reasons the drafters of the Rome Statute cited for excluding 
children from the ICC’s jurisdiction included “resource constraints, curial 
competence regarding juvenile justice, sentencing issues, and the ability to provide 
specialized detention facilities for juveniles and properly trained staff.”
160
 
While Article 26 clearly excludes the ICC’s jurisdiction over child soldiers, it 
does not close the question of their culpability before other international tribunals.  
“Indeed, Article 26 was arguably not based on the belief that children under 
eighteen” are incapable of committing war crimes or should not be prosecuted for 





 154 See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 
of the Statute (Mar. 7, 2014); Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgment 
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Dec. 18, 2012). 
 155 See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05 (ongoing); Prosecutor v. Ongwen, 
Case No. ICC-02/04-01/15, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Against Dominic Ongwen 
(Mar. 23, 2016) (ongoing). 
 156 See generally Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, Judgment Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute (Oct. 19, 2016); Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 21, 2016). 
 157 Rome Statute, supra note 148, art. 26.  Given this limit on the ICC’s jurisdiction, the 
closest the ICC has come to prosecuting a child soldier is its ongoing prosecution of Dominic 
Ongwen, a prior commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army.  See DARIJA MARKOVIĆ, CHILD 
SOLDIERS: VICTIMS OR WAR CRIMINALS? 12–13 (2015), http://www.ra-
un.org/uploads/4/7/5/4/47544571/paper__2_.pdf.  Ongwen was indicted for the commission of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in Uganda that he committed when he was about twenty-nine 
years old.  Id.  However, Ongwen was a child soldier before rising through the ranks of the LRA; 
like so many other Ugandan children, he was abducted by the LRA in broad daylight while walking 
to school.  Id. 
 158 DRUMBL, supra note 95, at 119. 
 159 Id. at 121.  Some have argued that this decision “meshes with . . . Article 17 of the Rome 
Statute, [which] provides that national jurisdictions shall have the first opportunity to investigate 
and prosecute allegations of Rome Statute crimes.”  Id. 
 160 Id. at 120. 
 161 Debarre, supra note 121, at 7. 
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IV.     CLOSING THE GAP 
Though recent international efforts mark clear advancements in the protection 
of children’s rights, one major gap persists: clear law relating to the culpability and 
prosecution of child soldiers.  While the international community has explicitly and 
repeatedly condemned the enlistment and use of child soldiers in hostilities, it 
remains unclear whether children can or should be prosecuted for international 
crimes they commit in the context of armed conflicts.  Apart from the ICC and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, no international convention or court has explicitly 
addressed this issue. 
The body of law surveyed in Parts II and III of this Essay demonstrates that 
there is a clear disconnect between international criminal law on paper and 
international criminal law in practice.  Relevant conventions and U.N. resolutions 
that seem to suggest that child soldiers may be legally prosecuted by international 
tribunals simultaneously show a clear preference for rehabilitation and reintegration.  
Similarly, the statutes for ad hoc and special courts have allowed for the prosecution 
of children, but the prosecutorial strategies and practices of these tribunals show a 
clear reluctance to try them.  “Despite the absence of a[n explicit] ban on the criminal 
prosecution of child soldiers, none have ever been prosecuted by an international 
court.”
162
  As the number of children serving in armed forces across the world 
continues to rise, this gap in international criminal law must be closed. 
In order to find the appropriate balance between treating child soldiers as 
victims or perpetrators, we must focus on two clear themes within this fragmented 
body of law.  First, when dealing with child soldiers, the focus must be on the best 
interests of the child.
163
  This theme weaves its way throughout all of these 
conventions, resolutions, and statutes, finding its expression in jurisdictional 
limitations,
164
 explicit due process protections for children,
165
 limits on sentences of 
imprisonment,
166
 and prohibitions on capital punishment.
167
  The second theme is 
the obligation to rehabilitate child soldiers and reintegrate them into their 
communities, regardless of the crimes they have committed.
168
  Given these 
overarching themes, a strong argument can be made for the conclusion that 
 
 162 Id. at 2.  Some have gone so far as to argue that this tradition of excluding children from 
prosecution in international tribunals in the absence of a jurisdictional ban rises to the level of a 
“customary norm of international law.”  Id. at 10. 
 163 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 3. 
 164 See, e.g., SCSL Statute, supra note 140, art. 1, ¶ 1, art. 7, ¶ 1 (limiting the Court’s power 
to prosecuting “persons who bear the greatest responsibility” for violations of international and 
domestic law); Rome Statute, supra note 148, art. 26. 
 165 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, arts. 37, 40; Beijing Rules, 
supra note 107, ¶ 7. 
 166 See, e.g., SCSL Statute, supra note 140, art. 7, ¶ 2; Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
supra note 85 arts. 37(a)–(b); Beijing Rules, supra note 107, ¶¶ 18.1, 19.1.  
 167 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 37(a); Beijing Rules, 
supra note 107, ¶ 17.2; Additional Protocol I, supra note 73, art. 77; Additional Protocol II, supra 
note 77, art. 6, ¶ 4; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 71, art. 68. 
 168 See, e.g., SCSL Statute, supra note 140, art. 7, ¶ 1; Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra 
note 100, art. 6, ¶¶ 1, 3, 7; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, arts. 39, 40, ¶ 1; 
Beijing Rules, supra note 107, ¶ 18.1(a)–(h). 
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international tribunals should not prosecute children below the age of eighteen for 
their crimes. 
A.   Fixing the Age of Criminal Liability at Eighteen 
In the future, international courts should follow the lead of the ICC and institute 
an absolute prohibition on the prosecution of children who committed crimes when 
they were under the age of eighteen.
169
  Given difficulties in establishing the mental 
culpability of children, the importance of a child’s best interests, and the realities of 
life as a child soldier, it is best to leave prosecution of children for crimes committed 
in armed conflicts to national courts and Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. 
1.   Choosing Eighteen as the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility 
Setting the international age of culpability at eighteen would be consistent with 
existing law.  Although national approaches to the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility vary widely, this limit is consistent with the CRC, which defines a 
child as anyone under the age of eighteen.
170
  This approach also aligns with the 
ICC, which excludes anyone who was below that age at the commission of their 
crimes from its jurisdiction.
171
  Setting the minimum age of criminal responsibility 
at eighteen is also consistent with the shift in international law toward prohibiting 
the recruitment and use of children under that age in armed conflicts.
172
 
Though setting a minimum age of criminal responsibility may seem arbitrary, 
it is crucial that a precise age be chosen.  While some have argued that it would be 
best to take subjective factors such as the accused’s actual maturity, personality, and 
capacity for understanding the consequences of his or her actions into account,
173
 
such an approach would be highly inconsistent.  Objectively drawing the line at 
eighteen may be over- or underinclusive in terms of moral culpability, but a 
 
 169 Though a revision of one or more of the conventions and U.N. Resolutions discussed in 
this Essay could also bring clarity to this issue, that may not be advisable.  All of the legal 
instruments covered in this Essay govern the rights of children at both the international and the 
national level.  Given the wide-ranging ages of criminal responsibility among nations, it is best to 
anticipate that some children will be prosecuted for domestic or international crimes at the national 
level and will need those protections.  Providing states with guiding due process and rehabilitation 
principles will serve as a means of protecting children who are subject to state prosecution. 
 170 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 85, art. 1.  Setting the minimum age 
of criminal responsibility at age eighteen is also consistent with the CRC’s “underlying 
rehabilitative goals,” as it will maximize opportunities for young offenders to access rehabilitative 
services.  Grossman, supra note 10, at 347. 
 171 See Rome Statute, supra note 148, art. 26. 
 172 See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text (describing the amendments made to the 
CRC by the Optional Protocol); see also supra notes 141–47 and accompanying text (explaining 
that, in practice, the SCSL did not prosecute anyone under the age of fifteen despite the opportunity 
created by the SCSL Statute). 
 173 See, e.g., Erin Lafayette, Note, The Prosecution of Child Soldiers: Balancing 
Accountability with Justice, 63 SYRACUSE L. REV. 297, 304 (2013) (“To determine when a child 
has the sufficient metal capacity to . . . be held responsible for[] his actions in armed conflict, an 
adolescent’s right to form and express his own opinions must be examined in light of his 
psychological development and cultural perspective.”). 
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retrospective, case-by-case assessment of a child’s maturity at the time they 
committed a crime would be incredibly imprecise.  Setting a precise age, below 
which individuals cannot be prosecuted, will ensure that all children are subject to 
equal responsibility under the law. 
Choosing the age of eighteen as the lower limit for criminal accountability also 
reflects the state of children’s ongoing psychological and moral development prior 
to that age.  While all individuals mature at different rates, children generally do 
“not have the requisite mental, physical, or moral development to make a logical 
decision regarding [their] participation in [a] conflict” before the age of eighteen.
174
  
Numerous studies have established that children “lack the capacity to determine their 
best interests, to independently form opinions or to analyze competing 
ideologies.”
175
  Children are also prone to “irrational, emotion-driven behavior,”
176
 
and generally lack the mental maturity “to act independently or appreciate the rights 
of others.”
177
  Because they lack the necessary mental and moral maturity to make 
informed decisions, children are “more easily coerced or influenced into committing 
atrocities” and more prone to acquiesce to outside pressures.
178
 
2.   Meeting the Mens Rea Standard 
Setting the minimum age of criminal responsibility at eighteen will also 
alleviate difficulties related to establishing a child’s moral culpability.  To establish 
a child soldier’s criminal liability, it is not enough to simply demonstrate that he or 
she committed a particular act.  Each crime requires a union of actus reus—the 
physical act of the crime—and the requisite mens rea—the particular state of mind 
at the time of the crime.  As discussed in the subsection IV(A)(1), “studies 
demonstrate that, up to a certain age, a child is not fully able to understand his or her 
acts.”
179
  As a consequence of their ongoing psychological development, many child 
soldiers do not have the capacity to commit particular crimes with the required 
intent.  Although “the exact age at which an individual can commit a criminal act 
with the required mens rea element is not clearly determined,” it is far easier for a 
court to presume that an adult acted with the requisite moral culpability than to 
determine the state of mind of a soldier under the age of eighteen.
180
  The difficulty 
of establishing that a child acted with the requisite mens rea is further compounded 
by the reality that most child soldiers are severely abused and forced to commit 
crimes under duress or under the influence of desensitizing drugs or alcohol.
181
 
International crimes have particularly onerous mens rea requirements and it 
would be difficult to demonstrate that child soldiers had the mental capacity to 
 
 174 Id. at 303. 
 175 See Abbott, supra note 1, at 517. 
 176 David Pimentel, The Widening Maturity Gap: Trying and Punishing Juveniles as Adults 
in an Era of Extended Adolescence, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 71, 84 (2013). 
 177 Grossman, supra note 10, at 347. 
 178 Debarre, supra note 121, at 2–3. 
 179 Fanny Leveau, Liability of Child Soldiers Under International Criminal Law, 4 OSGOODE 
HALL REV. L. & POL’Y 36, 38 (2013). 
 180 Id. 
 181 See supra Section I.D. 
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commit them.
182
  Some international crimes require a special intent in addition to the 
crime’s traditional mens rea requirement.  To meet the legal standard for the 
international crime of genocide, for example, it would have to be shown that a child 
acted with a specific “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group.”
183
  On top of that, it would have to be shown that the child had 
the intent to commit one of the five underlying acts that constitute genocide.
184
  Other 
international crimes, such as crimes against humanity, require knowledge of the 
existence of particular circumstances.  To demonstrate that a child soldier committed 
a crime against humanity, it would have to be shown that the child committed the 
act “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 
population, with knowledge of the attack.”
185
 
3.   Safeguarding the Best Interests of Children 
Excluding children from the jurisdiction of international tribunals will also 
safeguard their best interests.  Participation in a criminal trial could be very 
psychologically damaging for a former child soldier.  Forcing a child to recount their 
involvement in atrocities could threaten their psychological healing, cause them 
further trauma, and delay their return to any sense of normalcy.
186
  Forcing a child 
soldier to stand trial would also leave them at a higher risk of stigmatization and 
make it more difficult for them to reintegrate into society.
187
  If a child was formally 
charged as a war criminal, “any community doubt concerning [their] actions [would] 




There are also practical reasons for excluding children from the jurisdiction of 
international tribunals.  If children know that they could be subject to prosecution 
they may be more reluctant to disarm.
189
  In addition, all international tribunals are 
limited in their time, funding, and resources.  Given these limitations, international 
tribunals could not necessarily uphold the procedural safeguards for children that are 
required by international law.  Given the number of children involved in armed 
conflict, some have argued that opening the door to their prosecution could 
overwhelm courts.  However, that is unlikely to be the case.  Historically, only a 
fraction of the individuals who are most culpable in the wake of a conflict are 
indicted and prosecuted by international tribunals.  It is unlikely that children would 
be among those who are responsible for the most atrocious crimes.  It is also unlikely 
 
 182 Some have “argued that international crimes have such onerous mens rea requirements 
that children will always lack the capacity to commit them.”  See, e.g., Happold, supra note 76, at 
72. 
 183 Rome Statute, supra note 148, art. 6. 
 184 Id. art. 6(a)–(e). 
 185 Id. art. 7, ¶ 1. 
 186 See Debarre, supra note 121, at 17. 
 187 See id. 
 188 Sara A. Ward, Note, Criminalizing the Victim: Why the Legal Community Must Fight to 
Ensure That Child Soldier Victims Are Not Prosecuted as War Criminals, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
821, 833 (2012). 
 189 Ramgoolie, supra note 41, at 156. 
2019] F A L L I N G  T H R O U G H  T H E  G A P  123 
that a prosecutor would consider it necessary to put their already limited time and 
resources toward a child’s trial. 
4.   Leaving Determinations of Culpability to Truth and Reconciliation 
Commissions and Domestic Courts 
Those who favor the prosecution of child soldiers have argued that their trials 
will provide communities with a much-needed sense of finality and give those who 
have suffered years of violence and fear the justice they deserve.
190
  However, 
prosecuting child soldiers at the international level is not the only means of bringing 
about the “justice” so many people demand.  In multiple instances, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions (“TRCs”) have proven themselves to be an effective 
means of bringing communities a sense of closure in the aftermath of a conflict.
191
  
Unlike criminal trials, TRCs do not play a “punitive, prosecutorial role.”
192
  Instead, 
TRCs “allow[] perpetrators and victims of human rights violations to come forward 
and account for their actions in the spirit of promoting national peace and 
reconciliation.”
193
  TRCs such as the one established in Sierra Leone have been an 
“effective means of providing a non-judicial and non-punitive approach to 
accountability for child soldiers.”
194
  In addition to promoting healing within a 
community, TRCs also foster the child’s “total rehabilitation and social reintegration 
in accordance with” the overriding goals of the CRC,
195
 the Optional Protocol to the 
CRC,
196
 and the Beijing Rules.
197
 
The jurisdictional limitation proposed in this Essay also would not inhibit the 
ability of domestic courts to prosecute children who were under the age of eighteen 
at the time of the commission of their crimes.  Given the highly varied conceptions 
of childhood among cultures and the wide-ranging minimum ages of criminal 
 
 190 Other arguments in favor of prosecuting children have major flaws.  For instance, some 
have argued that, in the absence of judicial accountability, the leaders of armed groups will be more 
likely to encourage children to commit atrocious crimes.  See, e.g., Megan Nobert, Children at 
War: The Criminal Responsibility of Child Soldiers, 2011 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION 
1, 1; Lafayette, supra note 173, at 311.  The leaders of these armed groups are individuals who are 
willing to kidnap children and murder defenseless civilians to accomplish their agendas.  Simply 
put, there is not much they are unwilling to do; it is probably safe to say that the remote possibility 
of prosecution is far from their minds in the heat of an armed conflict.  The adults who recruit and 
utilize child soldiers view them as dispensable manpower, and it would be far more effective to 
subject them to prosecution for their actions than the children they employ.  Others have argued 
that, in the absence of prosecution, “mayhem and social disorder will result.”  See, e.g., Joshua A. 
Romero, Note, The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Juvenile Soldier Dilemma, 2 NW. J. 
INT’L HUM. RTS. 2, 11 (2004).  Should that be a legitimate concern in the wake of a conflict, a 
nation could prosecute child soldiers at the national level (as discussed in this Section). 
 191 See Ward, supra note 188, at 835. 
 192 Zarifis, supra note 122, at 20. 
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 194 Ward, supra note 188 at 835. 
 195 Zarifis, supra note 122, at 21; see also Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 
85, arts. 39, 40, ¶ 1. 
 196 See Optional Protocol to the CRC, supra note 100, arts. 6, ¶ 3, 7, ¶ 1. 
 197 See Beijing Rules, supra note 107, ¶ 18.1(a)–(h); see also SCSL Statute, supra note 140, 
art. 7, ¶ 1. 
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responsibility across nations, domestic courts are a much more appropriate forum 
for such prosecutions. 
Examples of prosecutions of child soldiers for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, or other international crimes in national courts are extremely rare, but not 
nonexistent.  After the Rwandan genocide, “the genocide victims’ desire for 
retribution in the name of justice . . . resulted in the arrest and detention of” over one 
thousand children.
198
  It was the first time in history that children were imprisoned 
for genocide, but very few of them were ever tried for their crimes.
199
  In 2000, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo executed a fourteen-year-old child soldier for his 
involvement in the violence that has long gripped that country.
200
  When the 
Democratic Republic of Congo imposed death sentences on another four child 
soldiers between the ages of fourteen and sixteen the following year, a number of 
Nongovernmental Organizations (“NGOs”) intervened.
201
  After much lobbying, the 
sentences were not carried out.
202
  Similarly, in 2002 the Ugandan government 
brought treason charges against two former Lord’s Resistance Army fighters who 
were fourteen and sixteen years old.
203
  Again, NGOs intervened and successfully 
pressured the government to withdraw the charges.
204
 
Western countries have also tried child soldiers for the commission of 
international crimes.  In a highly publicized case in 2010, the U.S. Military 
Commission tried a former child soldier for Al-Qaeda, Omar Khadr, for murder and 
attempted murder in violation of the laws of war.
205
  Khadr had thrown a grenade in 
Afghanistan that killed an American soldier and injured two others.
206
  When Khadr 
challenged his detention, the Commission determined that “neither customary 
international law nor international treaties binding upon the United States prohibit 
the trial of a person for alleged violations of the law of nations committed when he 
was 15 years of age.”
207
 
5.   Viewing Child Soldiers as Victims 
Given the realities of life as a child soldier described in Part I, it is far more 
appropriate to view these children as the victims of violence rather than as its 
perpetrators.  Children are more vulnerable than any other age group, and armed 
groups exploit characteristics inextricably linked to their childhood to turn them into 
vicious fighters.  After they are separated from their families, child soldiers are 
subject to beatings, routine punishments, forced labor, and sexual exploitation.  They 
 
 198 Chen Reis, Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of Prosecuting 
Children for Participation in Internal Armed Conflict, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 629, 630 
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¶ 18 (2d ed. 2012)).  
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are systematically brainwashed by adults until their ethics and moral values are so 
distorted that they lose any sense of who they were before their involvement in the 
conflict.  Most of their crimes are committed under the threat of injury or death, and 
many act under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs or alcohol.  It goes without 
saying that children who are forcibly recruited do not exercise their consent to serve 
in an armed conflict, but “voluntary” recruitment is also coupled with hidden forms 
of coercion.  More often than not, children who voluntarily join armed forces are 
driven to do so in order to fulfill their basic needs, and they rarely understand the 
gravity of what they are signing themselves up for.  Setting the minimum age of 
criminal responsibility at eighteen will reflect these realities of life as a child soldier. 
Setting the minimum age of criminal responsibility at eighteen will also ensure 
that, in the wake of an armed conflict, the focus is on rehabilitating and reintegrating 
former child soldiers rather than on prosecuting them.
208
  Because participation in 
“[a]rmed conflict affects all aspects of child development—physical, mental and 
emotional,” effective rehabilitative services are crucial to helping former child 
soldiers realize that their lives do not need to be driven by violence.
209
  Studies have 
shown that, without effective rehabilitative services, disarmed children are more 
likely to drift into a life of further violence and crime, and will often rejoin their 
comrades and take up arms.
210
  Providing former child soldiers with access to an 
education, job training, or work programs can break this cycle and help them 
“disengage from the idea that violence is a legitimate means of achieving one’s 
aims.”
211
  In addition, education can “normalize life” for a former child soldier, help 
them develop healthy peer relationships, and improve their self-esteem.
212
  
Reintegration programs can also help children reestablish contact with their families 
and communities.  “[A]t the end of a conflict, a child’s rehabilitation is often best 
promoted by reuniting them with their family and community, and reintegrating the 
familiar local cultures and traditions into their daily life.”
213
  Taken together, these 
efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate former child soldiers will help them resume life 
within the community and “channel [their] energy, ideas and experience” into 




 208 Given the repeated emphasis in U.N. Conventions, resolutions, and court statutes on 
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be rehabilitated and reintegrated.”  Id. at 15. 
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B.   Establishing a Distinct Legal Standard for Hybrid Tribunals 
While the default should be to exclude children from prosecution in 
international courts, difficulties could arise in the formation of hybrid international-
domestic tribunals.  As the United Nation’s experience negotiating the creation of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone demonstrated,
215
 some nations with minimum 
ages of criminal responsibility below eighteen may insist on holding child soldiers 
accountable for their crimes.  While the aim should always be to exclude children 
from a hybrid tribunal’s jurisdiction, there may be cases where it is necessary to hold 
children accountable in order to legitimize the court and its mission.  In such cases, 
a firm legal standard distinguishing children from adults must be put in place. 
Building off of the agreement reached between Sierra Leone and the United 
Nations, only those children who are responsible for the greatest violations of 
international law—namely war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide—
should be subject to a hybrid court’s jurisdiction.  This limitation will exclude child 
soldiers who did not take an active part in hostilities from the court’s jurisdiction.  
Since the vast majority of child soldiers are not in leadership roles and are not 
responsible for committing crimes on a massive scale, this limitation will also shield 
almost all children from criminal responsibility.  In addition, the minimum age of 
criminal culpability should not be set lower than fifteen.  Multiple provisions of 
international law have established fifteen as the minimum age to legally recruit and 
use children in armed forces, including Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions
216
 and the CRC (prior to its amendment by the Optional Protocol).
217
  
If children under the age of fifteen are considered too young to be recruited by armed 
groups, they must be too young to be held criminally accountable for their actions.  
Finally, additional safeguards should be put in place to guarantee that children 
accused of committing atrocities had the ability to understand the consequences of 
their actions and form the requisite intent.  In addition to demonstrating that a child 
had the requisite moral culpability to commit the crimes he or she was accused of, it 
should be shown that the child voluntarily joined the armed forces. 





 and the Beijing Rules,
220
 the statute for a 
hybrid tribunal should allow a child’s age and circumstances to serve as mitigating 
factors and clearly list available defenses.  Given the fact that many of the offenses 
children commit are the product of coercion or manipulation by adults, the defenses 
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 and superior orders
223
 will be particularly applicable in 
hybrid tribunals.  Finally, the sanctions a child soldier can be subjected to must be 
limited.  Imprisonment should be a last resort, and the death penalty and life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole should be expressly forbidden.
224
  
Consistent with the body of international criminal law explored in this Essay, the 
focus should be on rehabilitating child soldiers and reintegrating them into their 
communities. 
CONCLUSION 
The difficulty of balancing cries for justice with the best interests of children 
has resulted in a clear gap in international criminal law.  Although the relevant 
international conventions, U.N. resolutions, and court and tribunal statutes seem to 
lead to the conclusion that child soldiers may be held accountable for their crimes, 
the question of prosecution is far from clear-cut.  As the number of child soldiers 
across the world continues to rise, there must be a coherent response to this issue 
that is consistent with existing standards of international law. 
Moving forward, the best interests of the child standard instructs us that 
victimhood must win out over prosecution.  Continued emphasis must be placed on 
prosecuting the adult commanders who are responsible for recruiting and using 
children in armed conflicts, and future international courts and tribunals should 
exclude all children who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their alleged 
crimes from their jurisdiction.  Rather than forcing children to stand trial, the focus 
must be on rehabilitating former child soldiers and promoting the reintegration of 
children into their communities.  “Children are humanity’s most valuable investment 
in the future,”
225
 and closing this gap in international criminal law will afford them 
the protection they need and deserve. 
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